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G. JEANIE VAUGHN, 
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KENT A.HOGGAN and 
MAPLE OAKS, L.C. 
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vs. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal which has been ass igned to the Court of Appeals 
by the Supreme Court. Jur isd ic t ion is based upon §78-2a-3(2) (k) of the 
Utah Code. There have been no prior appeals . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
BRIEF OF T H I R D - P A R T Y 
D E F E N D A N T - A P P E L L E E 
BOUNTIFUL CITY 
1 
There are a number of issues presented by the Pla int i f fs-Appel lants 
Robert and Jeanie Vaughn (here inaf ter "Vaughns") and Defendants-
Appel lees Kent Hoggan and Maple Oaks (hereinaf ter "Maple Oaks") . 
However, the invo lvement of Th i rd-Par ty Defendant -Appe l lee Bount i fu l 
City (hereinaf ter "Bount i fu l City") in this appeal is l imi ted to the issues 
numbered Fourth and Fifth in the Vaughns ' appeal brief. Bount i fu l City 
bel ieves a more proper s ta tement of those issues is as fo l lows : 
1. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN ITS HANDLING OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FILED BY THE VAUGHNS AGAINST 
BOUNTIFUL CITY? 
2. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN ITS DENIAL OF A MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE THIS 
CASE WITH ANOTHER CASE FILED LATER? 
The standard of appellate review stated by the Vaughns is accepted. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The fol lowing provis ions are determinat ive or of centra l importance 
to this appeal : 
Utah Rules of Civi l Procedure: 
Rule 42 (set out in ful l on page 10) 
Rule 61 ( re levant part set out on page 12) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(a) The Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a f inal order deciding a contract case upon a 
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motion for summary judgment and denying conso l ida t ion with another 
quiet t i t le case, in the Second Distr ict Court of Davis County, Utah. 
Jur isdict ion is based upon §78-2a-3(2)(k) of the Utah Code. There have 
been no prior appeals . 
(b) The Course of Proceed ings . 
The Vaughns f i led a Complaint (R. 1-6) and an Amended Complaint 
(R. 7-21) against Maple Oaks over cer ta in contract gr ievances, seeking 
specif ic performance and damages and al leging tort ious interference with 
contract . 
Maple Oaks denied these a l legat ions in its Answer , Counterc la im 
and Third Party Complaint (R. 29-47), and f i led a Counterc la im (R. 37-38) 
sounding in quiet t i t le against the Vaughns. Maple Oaks also brought in 
Bount i fu l City as a Third Party Defendant in the quiet t i t le claim (R. 37-
38). 
Bount i fu l City f i led a Motion to Dismiss the Third Party action as 
being improper, but with an Answer in the event the d ismissal was denied 
(R. 343-345) . S imul taneously , Bount i fu l City f i led a separate action 
(Case No. 94-0700375-QT, Davis County, Second Distr ict Court) for quiet 
t i t le , naming the Vaughns, Maple Oaks, and others not in the present suit 
as Defendants (three prior owners and developers and any unknown 
c la imants) . 
On November 2, 1994, Maple Oaks f i led a Mot ion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 60-62) against Vaughns on all contract c la ims on the basis 
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of resciss ion. This motion was argued on December 13th (R. 327), and on 
January 6, 1995, Judge Memmott granted this mot ion in a memorandum 
decis ion (R. 346-350) . 
On January 27th Maple Oaks f i led a Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim 
and Third Party Complaint (R. 351-353) . 
On February 2nd Vaughns f i led a Mot ion for Consol idat ion of this 
case with the quiet t i t le case f i le by Bount i fu l City (R. 369-370) . 
On February 17th Vaughns f i led a Mot ion for Summary Judgment 
against Bount i fu l City (R. 404-406) . 
All pending motions were heard by Judge Memmott on March 7, 1995 
(R. 424), a n d a F i n a l O r d e r was f i led on March 30th (R. 425-427) . 
(c) Disposit ion in the Court Below. 
The t r ia l court issued a Final Order (R. 425-427) , making the 
fo l lowing d ispos i t ions: 
1. The previous order grant ing Maple Oak's Mot ion for Summary 
Judgment was re-s ta ted. 
2. The Amended Complaint of the Vaughns was dismissed with 
pre jud ice, but the right of Vaughns to f i le non-cont rac t claims in a 
separate act ion was preserved. 
3. The Vaughns ' Motion for Conso l ida t ion wi th the quiet t i t le case 
f i led by Bount i fu l City was denied. 
4. Maple Oaks' Motion for Dismissal of Counterc la ims and Third 
Party Complaint was granted. 
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The Court stated that it " intends this order to be a f ina l judgment , 
which d isposes of all of the claims between all of the par t ies . " 
(d) Statement of the Facts-
There are many facts relevant to the contract issues between the 
Vaughns and Maple Oaks, but since Bounti ful City is not involved in those 
issues it wi l l defer to those parties to make Statements of Fact concerning 
them. As to facts relat ing to the two issues on appeal involv ing Bount i ful 
City ( i .e. , the Vaughns ' Motion for Summary Judgment against Bount i fu l 
City and the tr ial court 's denial of the Vaughn's Motion for Consol idat ion) , 
reference is made to the Course of Proceedings paragraph above. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL 
1. THE FINAL ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS A DENIAL 
OF THE VAUGHNS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The Final Order of the tr ia l court is a rul ing on all outstanding 
matters, including the Vaughns ' Motions for Summary Judgment against 
Maple Oaks and against Bount i fu l City. The Final Order s ta tes: "The 
Court intends this order to be a f inal judgment , which d isposes of all of the 
claims between all of the par t ies." [Emphasis added. ] 
Reviewing the Final Order with this intent in mind wi l l show that the 
Vaughns ' mot ions were ef fect ively d isposed of by the tr ia l court. 
Summary Judgment in favor of Maple Oaks was granted on the Amended 
Compla in t , which was d ismissed. Maple Oaks ' Mot ion for Dismissal of 
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Counterc la ims and Third Party Complaint was also g ran ted . 
When t he t r i a l court gave summary judgment to Maple Oaks, it was 
thereaf ter impossib le for it to give part ia l summary judgment to the 
Vaughns against Maple Oaks. The Amended Complaint was d ismissed 
with pre jud ice, so it was impossib le for any rel ief to be granted based 
upon it. 
The Amended Complaint of the Vaughns stated no claim against 
Bounti ful City; hence, no Motion for Summary Judgment against Bount i ful 
City could be based upon it. The Amended Complaint was d ismissed 
anyway. The only pleading capable of being a basis for the Vaughns to 
f i le a Motion for Summary Judgment against Bount i fu l City was the 
Counterc la im and Third Party Complaint of Maple Oaks, but the Court 
granted Maple Oaks 'mot ion to dismiss them. It was therefore impossible 
for any rel ief to be granted to Vaughns against Bount i fu l City. 
2. THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE DECISION 
OF THE TRIAL COURT TO DENY THE MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE. 
In their appeal brief Vaughns complain of the t r ia l court 's decis ion 
not to consol idate the present case with a quiet t i t le case f i led by 
Bounti ful City. A great deal of d iscret ion is af forded t r ia l judges in their 
dec is ions on whether to consol idate cases, and their decis ions are 
overturned only for an abuse of that d iscre t ion . App l icab le cases are as 
fo l lows: 
The decis ion of the tr ial court not to consol idate was wel l wi th in the 
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l imit of reasonabi l i ty . The Amended Complaint f i led in this case was one 
for breach of contract, and the judge had granted Maple Oaks' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on that issue. The other case f i led by Bount i fu l City 
was a quiet t i t le act ion, involv ing issues and part ies wel l beyond the 
contract case. The cases do no involve common quest ions of law or fact. 
(U.R.C.P. 42(a)) Actual ly, the decision not to consol idate freed Vaughns 
to make this appeal on their contract case, and avoided holding that case 
up whi le the quiet t i t le case remained pend ing. 
The Vaughns argue that the cases should be consol idated but the 
contract and quiet t i t le issues tr ied separate ly , which is legal ly possible 
but eminent ly i l log ica l . The very suggest ion of it demonstrates the 
reasonab leness of the tr ia l court 's refusal to conso l ida te . The contract 
issue and the quiet t i t le issue are fundamenta l ly d i f ferent in law, issues, 
ev idence, wi tnesses and to a s igni f icant extent par t ies . 
3. ANY ERRORS IN THE HANDLING OF THE VAUGHNS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST BOUNTIFUL CITY, 
OR IN THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION, 
WERE HARMLESS AND THEREFORE NON-REVERSIBLE. 
Even assuming that there was an error in the way the tr ial court 
handled the Vaughns ' Motion for Summary Judgment against Bount i fu l 
Ci ty, or that there was an error in the denia l of the Motion for 
Consol idat ion, those errors were harmless and therefore not revers ib le. 
It is wel l estab l ished in Utah law that errors must be both harmful and 
prejudic ia l in order to be reversed, and that the burden of proving this is 
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upon the appel lant . 
In this case, Vaughns complain concerning their Motion for Summary 
Judgment , and concern ing their Motion for Conso l ida t ion with the quiet 
t i t le case f i led by Bount i fu l City. But all of the quiet t i t le issues they 
wished to pursue were preserved. The Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Bount i fu l City involved their claim to ownersh ip of the disputed 
land, and the tr ial court 's Final Order preserved that prec ise issue in the 
surv iv ing quiet t i t le case. The same issues would be heard before the 
same Judge. 
In their brief, Vaughns fai l ent i re ly to carry their burden of proof. 
They neither show nor even argue that there is prejudice to themselves in 
these dec is ions. 
ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL 
1. THE FINAL ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS A DENIAL 
OF THE VAUGHNS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Vaughns claim in thisr appeal that their Mot ion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 255-256) against Maple Oaks and their Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Bount i fu l City (R. 404-406) were not ruled upon. 
However, the Final Order is in fact a rul ing on all ou ts tand ing matters. 
It is c lear ly stated in the Final Order entered by Judge Memmott in 
the t r ia l : 
7. The Court intends this order to be a f ina l judgment , 
which d isposes of all of the claims between all of the par t ies. 
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Reviewing the Final Order with this intent in mind shows that the 
Vaughns ' mot ions were ef fect ive ly d isposed of: 
1. The previous order grant ing Maple Oak's Mot ion for Summary 
Judgment was re -s ta ted . 
2. The Amended Complaint of the Vaughns was d ismissed with 
pre judice, but the right of Vaughns to f i le non-cont ract c la ims in a 
separate act ion was preserved. 
3. The Vaughns ' Motion for Consol idat ion with the quiet t i t le case 
f i led by Bount i fu l City was den ied. 
4. The Maple Oaks Motion for At torney 's Fees was den ied . 
5. Maple Oaks' Motion for Dismissal of Counterc la ims and Third 
Party Complaint was gran ted . 
6. The Pla in t i f fs ' remaining claims against John Does 1-5 were 
d ismissed, wi thout pre jud ice. 
When the t r ia l court granted summary judgment to Maple Oaks, it 
was thereafter impossible for it to grant part ia l summary judgment to the 
Vaughns. The Amended Complaint (R. 7-21) was d ismissed with 
prejudice, so it was impossible f o rany relief to be granted based upon it. 
When viewed in l ight of the Court 's intent to make a f inal d isposi t ion of all 
claims between the part ies, this is clearly a denial of the Vaughns ' Motion 
for Summary Judgment against Maple Oaks. 
The Amended Complaint of the Vaughns stated no claim against 
Bounti ful City; hence, no claim against Bount i ful City could be based upon 
it. The Amended Complaint was dismissed anyway. The only p leading 
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capable of being a basis for the Vaughns ' Mot ion for Summary Judgment 
against Bounti ful City was the Counterc la im and Third Party Complaint of 
Maple Oaks (R. 37-38), but the Court granted Maple Oaks ' Motion for 
Dismissal of Counterc la ims and Third Party Compla in t . It was therefore 
impossible for any relief to be granted to Vaughns against Bount i fu l City. 
The tr ial court intended to make a f inal d ispos i t ion of all c la ims between 
the part ies, so it clearly intended to and did deny the Vaughns ' Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Bount i fu l City. 
2. THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO IN THE 
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO DENY THE MOTION TO 
CONSOLIDATE. 
In their appeal brief Vaughns compla in of the t r ia l court 's decision 
not to consol idate the present case with a quiet t i t le case f i led by 
Bount i fu l City. This question is governed by Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of 
Civi l Procedure: 
(a) Conso l idat ion. When act ions involv ing a common 
quest ion of law or fact are pending before the court , it may 
o r d e r a j o i n t h e a r i n g o r t r i a l o f a n y o r a l l of the matters in issue 
in the act ions; it may order all the act ions conso l ida ted; and it 
may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may 
tend to avoid unnecessary costs or de lay. 
(b) Separate t r ia ls . The court in fu r therance of 
convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate tr ia l 
of any c la im, cross-c la im, counterc la im, or th i rd-par ty c la im, 
or of any separate issue or of any number of c la ims, cross-
c la ims, counterc la ims, th i rd-par ty c la ims, or issues. 
A great deal of d iscret ion is af forded t r ia l judges in thei r decisions 
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on whether to consol idate cases, and their decisions are over turned only 
for an abuse of that d isc re t ion . Appl icable cases are as fo l lows: 
Of course, t r ia l courts enjoy considerable d iscre t ion in 
deciding b i furcat ion and consol idat ion requests under rule 42 
of the Utah Rules of Civi l Procedure. See, e.g. , Coleman v. 
Di l lman. 624 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah 1981) (b i furcat ion under rule 
42 may be accompl ished for the convenience and at the 
discret ion of the tr ial court) ; Raggenbuckv. Suhrmann. 7 Utah 
2d 327, 329, 325 P.2d 258, 259 (1958) (absent pre jud ice to a 
l i t igant, the tr ia l court has discret ion to consol idate matters for 
t r ia l ) ; see also 9 C. Wright & A. Mil ler, Federal Pract ice and 
Procedure. 2392 (1971) (appel late court leaves d iscre t ion to 
tr ial court in b i furcat ing t r ia ls) . (Slusher v. Osp i ta l . 777 P.2d 
437 (Utah 1989)) 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, the conso l ida t ion 
of act ions, even when permiss ib le , cannot be demanded as a 
matter of r ight ; the matter rests wi th in the d iscret ion of the 
court, which wil l not be interfered wi th, unless clearly abused, 
particularly where the consolidation is denied. [Emphasis by 
the Court.] (Hassing v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.. 108 Utah 198, 159 
P.2d 117 (1945)) 
. . . [A]buse of d iscret ion means "that a rul ing (is) beyond 
the ' l imi ts of reasonabi l i ty . , n (State v. O'NeSl. 848 P.2d 694 
(Utah App. , 1993)) 
The decis ion of the tr ial court not to consol idate was wel l wi th in the 
limit of reasonabi l i ty . The Amended Complaint f i led in this case was for 
breach of cont ract , and the Judge had granted Defendant Maple Oaks' 
Motion for Summary Judgment . The other case, f i led by Bount i fu l City, 
was a quiet t i t le ac t ion , involv ing issues and part ies wel l beyond the 
contract case. Based upon Rule 42(a) as interpreted by the cases cited 
above, the tr ia l court 's denial of the Motion for Consol idat ion was proper 
because the two cases do not involve common issues of law and fact. 
Actua l ly , the dec is ion not to consol idate freed Vaughns to make this 
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appeal on their contract case, and avoided holding that case up while the 
quiet t i t le case remained pending. 
The Vaughns argue that the cases should be conso l idated but the 
contract and quiet t i t le issues tr ied separa te ly , which is legal ly possible 
but eminent ly i l log ica l . The very suggest ion of it demonstrates the 
reasonableness of the tr ial court 's refusal to conso l ida te . The contract 
issue and the quiet t i t le issue are fundamenta l l y d i f ferent in law, issues, 
ev idence, wi tnesses and, to a s ign i f icant extent , par t ies . Denial of the 
Motion for Consol idat ion was appropr ia te under the c i rcumstances. 
3. ANY ERRORS IN THE HANDLING OF THE VAUGHNS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST BOUNTIFUL CITY, 
OR IN THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION, 
WERE HARMLESS AND THEREFORE NON-REVERSIBLE. 
Even assuming that there was an error in the way the tr ial court 
handled the Vaughns ' Motion for Summary Judgment against Bount i ful 
Ci ty, or that there was an error in the denia l of the Motion for 
Consol idat ion, those errors were harmless and there fore not revers ib le. 
It is wel l establ ished in Utah law that errors must be both harmful and 
prejudic ia l in order to be reversed, and that the burden of proving this is 
upon the appel lant . The fo l lowing rule and cases demonst ra te this: 
No.. .error or defect in any rul ing or order or in anything 
done or omit ted by the cour t . . . is ground fo r . . .d is tu rb ing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such act ion appears 
to the court inconsistent with substant ia l jus t ice . The court at 
every stage of the proceeding must d is regard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substant ia l 
r ights of the part ies. (Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure. ) 
An appel la te court wi l l not reverse a judgment for mere 
error, unless the error involved is substant ia l and pre jud ic ia l . 
(Kesler v. Rogers. 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975)) 
It is the duty of the Supreme Court to d is regard errors 
unless they are so substant ia l as to af fect the r ights of the 
par t ies o r t h e l ikely outcome of the case. In Hi l lvard v. Utah 
Bv-Products Co.. 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953)) 
On appea l , the burden is upon the appe l lan t not only to 
show that there was error, but that the error was pre judic ia l to 
the extent that there is a reasonable l ike l ihood that it in its 
absence there would have been a d i f ferent resu l t . Joseph v. 
W.H. Groves Latter-Dav Saints HOSP. . 10 Utah 2d 94, 349 P.2d 
935 (1960)) 
An error is harmful only if there is a " reasonable 
l i ke l ihood that the error af fected the outcome of the 
p roceed ings . " (Jenkins v. Weiss. 868 P.2d 1374 (Utah App. 
1994)) 
The cont inu ing val id i ty of these themes was s tated in the recent 
d issent ing opin ion of Judge Orme in Askew v. Hardman. 884 P.2d 1258 
(Utah App. 1994): 
Even if the t r ia l court erred in rul ing that the insurance 
f i le was protected by the work product doc t r ine , such an 
er roneous decis ion "cannot result in revers ib le error unless 
the error is harmfu l . " State v. Hami l ton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 
(Utah 1992). See Jenkins v. Weiss. 868 P.2d 1374, 1376 
(Utah App. 1994). As a general rule, an error is harmless 
unless appel lant can demonstrate it was pre jud ic ia l to her 
case, i.e., unless there is a " reasonable l i ke l ihood that the 
error af fected the outcome of the proceedings. " 1 Stef fensen 
v. Smith 's Management Corp. . 820 P.2d 482, 489 (Utah App. 
1991) (quot ing State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 
1989)) , a f f d , 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, Vaughns complain concerning their Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the quiet t i t le issue, and concern ing thei r Motion for 
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Consol idat ion with the quiet t i t le case f i led by Bount i fu l City. But aJl of the 
quiet t i t le issues they wished to pursue were preserved. Paragraph 2 of 
the Final Order (R. 426) speci f ical ly reserved the right to the Vaughns to 
pursue non-contract claims in other act ions. The Motion for Summary 
Judgment involved their claim to ownership of the d isputed land, and the 
tr ial court 's Final Order preserved that precise issue in the surviving quiet 
t i t le case. The same issues would be heard before the same judge. 
These issues fal l squarely wi thin the def in i t ion of a harmless error: 
"Harmless" errors are "errors wh ich , a l though proper ly 
preserved below and presented on appea l , are suf f ic ient ly 
inconsequent ia l that we conclude there is no reasonable 
l ikel ihood that the error af fected the outcome of the 
proceedings." (State v. Hami l ton . 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1991)) 
In their brief, Vaughns fai l ent i re ly to carry their burden of proof. 
They neither show nor even argue that there is prejudice to themselves in 
these decis ions. 
CONCLUSION 
The Final Order of the t r ia l court should be af f i rmed without 
modi f ica t ion. 
Dated this ?&&_ day of August , 1995. 
/z&u~**+*<&f^ 
Russel l L. Mahan 
At torney for Bount i fu l City 
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